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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Payal Mehta appeals the District Court‟s Order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Fairleigh Dickinson University 
(“FDU”) and Dr. Robert McGrath (collectively, “Defendants”) on Ms. Mehta‟s 
discrimination, breach of contract, defamation, and negligence claims arising from 
Defendants‟ remedial response to Ms. Mehta‟s purportedly inadequate performance in 
FDU‟s doctoral clinical psychology program.  For the following reasons, we will vacate 
the District Court‟s Order granting summary judgment for Defendants on the 
discrimination claim, and affirm the Order granting summary judgment for Defendants 
on the breach of contract, defamation, and negligence claims. 
I. 
Ms. Mehta enrolled in the Ph.D. program in clinical psychology at FDU in 2006.  
During her second year in the program, Ms. Mehta participated in a clinical component of 
the program, also known as a practicum.  The practicum allows students to receive 
clinical experience under the supervision of faculty members who are licensed 
psychologists and who evaluate the students.  Ms. Mehta‟s practicum took place at 
FDU‟s Center for Psychological Services (“Center”), where she participated in the Adult 
Learning Disability & Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Clinic (“Clinic”). 
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Ms. Mehta‟s performance in the practicum was found to be deficient.  
Specifically, she was informed via email from Defendant Dr. McGrath, the director of the 
clinical training program, that the faculty had decided that her inadequate management of 
two cases warranted that she “complete another practicum focusing primarily on testing 
at the Center for Psychological Services.”  (App. 298.)1  Dr. McGrath also wrote that the 
faculty “strongly recommended that you sit in on the practicum course again,” and that 
“you consider the possibility of individual therapy to address what personal issues could 
have contributed to your problems . . . .”  (Id.)  Dr. McGrath subsequently emailed Ms. 
Mehta to inform her that the faculty adopted the proposed remedial conditions and 
explained that additional difficulties with meeting her clinical responsibilities could result 
in her termination from the program. 
Ms. Mehta did not appeal her remediation plan, and instead resigned from the 
Ph.D. program and enrolled in FDU‟s Master‟s Degree program.  She received a Master‟s 
Degree in May of 2010. 
Claiming that the imposition of a remedial plan was the product of race and gender 
discrimination, that Dr. McGrath had defamed her, that FDU had failed to follow proper 
                                              
1
 Among other things, the Clinic guidelines and procedures require that students 
contact their supervisor immediately after they are assigned a patient and complete their 
cases within eight weeks after their initial contact with the patient, unless they receive 
permission to deviate from that deadline.  Ms. Mehta had not issued reports on 
psychological testing of two patients within the allotted eight-week timeframe.  She 
claims that other doctoral candidates in her program did not submit reports on time, but 
were not required to repeat the practicum. 
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procedures in disciplining her, and that Defendants failed to supervise her clinical 
training, Ms. Mehta brought an action in state court under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq., Title IX of the Education  
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and for defamation, breach of contract, and 
negligence.  Ms. Mehta premised her discrimination claims on purportedly disparate 
treatment of other students and statements suggesting a discriminatory animus allegedly 
made by Dr. McGrath and Dr. Lana Tiersky, who served as director of the Clinic.  Ms. 
Mehta claimed that Dr. McGrath had defamed her by reporting to others that she was a 
public safety threat.  She further claimed that state law imposed a duty of care on FDU to 
supervise students in the doctoral program, and that FDU had failed to comply with the 
procedures for imposing disciplinary sanctions found in FDU‟s Code of Student Rights, 
Responsibilities and Conduct (“Student Code”). 
Defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and 
moved for summary judgment upon completion of discovery.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment on Ms. Metha‟s discrimination claims on the ground that Ms. Mehta 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corps. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and 
that the statements of discriminatory animus attributed to Drs. McGrath and Tiersky were 
too remote in time and vague to support a claim under the mixed-motive framework 
articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  The District Court also 
concluded that the public threat statements attributed to Dr. McGrath did not support a 
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defamation action, and that Ms. Mehta‟s negligent supervision and breach of contract 
claims were baseless.  Ms. Mehta‟s motion for reconsideration was denied, and this 
timely appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of 
the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  “For an issue to be genuine, „all that is required is that sufficient evidence 
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the 
parties‟ differing versions of the truth at trial.‟”  Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult 
Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).  
We review a district court‟s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.  Id. 
A. Discrimination 
The NJLAD prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating in the 
provision of accommodations and privileges because of, among other things, a person‟s 
race, national origin, nationality, or sex.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4.  Ms. Mehta contends 
that she has provided sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment under both a 




1. Price Waterhouse Framework 
Ms. Mehta claims that Dr. McGrath disclosed a discriminatory state of mind when 
he allegedly said to her in December of 2007, eight months before the remediation plan 
was imposed, that “she would only ever be able to practice psychology in an Indian 
community.”  (App. 25.)  Ms. Mehta further claims that Dr. Tiersky revealed a 
discriminatory mindset when she purportedly said to another faculty member that “I can‟t 
stand these passive Asian women.”  (Id. at 728.) 
Asserting that Dr. Tiersky‟s alleged statement that she could not “stand . . . passive 
Asian women,”2 and Dr. McGrath‟s alleged statement that Ms. Mehta would only be able 
to practice in an “Indian community” are both direct evidence of discrimination, Ms. 
Mehta argues that the mixed-motive framework of Price Waterhouse should shift the 
burden to Defendants to show that they would have imposed a remediation plan for Ms. 
Mehta even without considering an impermissible factor.  We disagree. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted our approach, as articulated in 
Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 339 (3d Cir. 2002), to determine whether evidence of 
discrimination is “direct” in the sense that the burden should shift to the defendants under 
                                              
2
 The District Court refused to consider the alleged statement by Dr. Tiersky 
because it found that it was “untimely” and was apparently a “new theor[y] of liability.”  
(See App. 11 n.2.)  We disagree with that characterization.  Ms. Mehta‟s reference to Dr. 
Tiersky‟s statement was not an attempt to assert a new claim or theory of liability.  Ms. 
Mehta brought a claim for race and sex discrimination, and Dr. Tierksy‟s statement 
regarding her feelings toward “passive Asian women” is relevant to such a claim.  As a 
result, the District Court erred by failing to consider Dr. Tiersky‟s statement. 
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Price Waterhouse.  See McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 816 A.2d 164, 169 (N.J. 
2003).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has characterized our holding in Fakete as 
requiring “a court [to] consider whether a statement made by a decisionmaker associated 
with the decisionmaking process actually bore on the employment decision at issue and 
communicated proscribed animus.”  Id. 
Here, Ms. Mehta has not demonstrated that Dr. Tiersky‟s statement about “passive 
Asian women,” which she allegedly made to another faculty member while leaving a 
staff meeting, actually bore on the decision to impose Ms. Mehta‟s remediation plan.  
Indeed, it is entirely unclear when Dr. Tiersky made that statement.  Likewise, Ms. Mehta 
has not shown any direct connection between Dr. McGrath‟s statement about her only 
being able to work in an Indian community—which he allegedly made eight months 
before the remediation plan was imposed—and the decision to implement the 
remediation plan.  Therefore, we conclude that these two statements do not constitute 




                                              
3
 In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Supreme Court 
held that the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive burden shifting test did not apply to claims 
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  Id. at 177-79.  The New 
Jersey state courts have recognized that the Gross decision has created a “thorny issue” as 
to whether the Price Waterhouse framework remains viable in age discrimination claims 
under the NJLAD, see O’Brien v. Telcordia Techs., Inc., 20 A.3d 1154, 1163 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2011).  This “thorny issue” may be just as relevant in race and sex 
discrimination claims under the NJLAD, as that statute encompasses the prohibition of 




2. McDonnell Douglas Framework 
Because we find the Price Waterhouse approach inapplicable here, Ms. Mehta 
may survive summary judgment on her discrimination claim if she can satisfy the test set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas.  See Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 867 A.2d 1133, 1139 
(N.J. 2005) (recognizing the New Jersey courts‟ adoption of the McDonnell Douglas test 
for NJLAD claims).  As the District Court explained, the appropriate adaptation of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie test for the circumstances in this case requires Ms. 
Mehta to show that she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was objectively qualified to 
study in the program and met the program‟s legitimate expectations; (3) received an 
adverse action; and (4) was treated differently than other similarly situated students.  See 
Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 834 (N.J. 2002) (“The precise elements of a 
prima facie case must be tailored to the particular circumstances.”).  Defendants do not 
dispute that Ms. Mehta meets the first and third prongs, but contend that, as the District 
Court found, she fails to meet the second and fourth prongs. 
The District Court concluded that Ms. Mehta failed to satisfy the second prong 
because it was undisputed that Ms. Mehta did not comply with program requirements 
concerning the timely completion of cases and keeping her supervisors informed of the 
status of her work with respect to two patients.  Contrary to the District Court‟s 
                                                                                                                                                  
Because we conclude that the statements of Drs. Tiersky and McGrath do not constitute 
direct evidence of discrimination, however, we need not weigh in on the continued 
viability of the Price Waterhouse framework in the context of NJLAD claims. 
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conclusion, we do not find these facts dispositive of whether Ms. Mehta has shown that 
she was objectively qualified to study in the program and was meeting FDU‟s legitimate 
expectations for purposes of making out a prima facie case of discrimination.  In the 
employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that, to 
satisfy the second prong, “[a]ll that is necessary is that the plaintiff produce evidence 
showing that she was actually performing the [position] prior to the” adverse action.  
Zive, 867 A.2d at 1143.   The court further explained that “even if a plaintiff candidly 
acknowledges, on his own case, that some performance issues have arisen, so long as he 
adduces evidence that he has, in fact, performed in the position up to the time of [the 
adverse action], the slight burden of the second prong is satisfied.”  Id. at 1144.  
Accordingly, while there may be some questions regarding Ms. Mehta‟s performance, we 
conclude that she has satisfied the second prong. 
The District Court concluded that, while Ms. Mehta showed that other students in 
the program also did not complete their reports in the specified timeframe and were not 
subjected to a remediation plan, she nevertheless failed to satisfy the fourth prong 
because she did not present evidence of the comparators‟ race or sex.  Ms. Mehta did, 
however, certify in her opposition to summary judgment that the three students she 
alleged had not been sanctioned for submitting late reports did not “belong[] to a racial 
minority group.”  (App. 753, ¶ 5.)  Her certification that the three comparators were not 
members of a racial minority group, combined with patients‟ clinical records showing 
that those students also did not complete their cases within the eight-week-timeframe 
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specified in the Clinic‟s procedures, provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth 
prong of the prima facie test. 
Because we find that Ms. Mehta has established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, we will vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on that claim.
4
 
B. Breach of Contract 
Ms. Mehta next argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
for Defendants on her breach of contract claim.  New Jersey courts have “reject[ed] the 
rigid application of contractual principles to university-student conflicts involving 
academic performance and [have] limit[ed] [their] scope of review to a determination [of] 
whether the procedures followed [by the school] were in accordance with the institution‟s 
rules and regulations.”  Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 719 A.2d 693, 697 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); see also Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 
A.2d 263, 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).  Therefore, we will limit our review to 
                                              
4
 It is true, as Defendants argue and the District Court found, that Ms. Mehta did 
not provide evidence as to whether these three other students apprised their supervisors of 
their progress or otherwise received permission to exceed the eight week time line for the 
completion of their cases.  We believe this fact is more relevant to whether Defendants 
can show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for imposing the remediation plan than 
whether Ms. Mehta has established a prima facie case at the outset.  Having found that 
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Ms. Mehta‟s discrimination 
claim based on its conclusion that she failed to make out a prima facie case, we need not 
address the subsequent steps in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test, which the 




whether Defendants complied with the FDU procedures that governed the imposition of a 
remediation plan for Ms. Mehta. 
Ms. Mehta contends that the rules and procedures applicable to her allegedly 
deficient performance in her clinical work were those contained in the Student Code, 
which provides that “[e]xcept in unusual circumstances, no disciplinary sanctions may be 
imposed upon students without notice of the nature and cause of the charges; and only 
after the opportunity to have a hearing that may include witnesses and the assistance of a 
person of their choosing.”  (App. 609.)  Defendants, however, contend that it is the Ph.D. 
Program Policies and Procedures (“Program Procedures”) that are applicable.  Those 
procedures provide that faculty will review students‟ progress in the program and may 
recommend the implementation of a remediation program if problems with a student‟s 
performance are identified.
5
  Because Ms. Mehta‟s purported deficiencies arose in the 
context of her academic performance in her clinical work, and the Program Procedures 
provide the required steps in implementing a remediation plan, we agree with the District 
Court that those procedures apply to her claim, rather than the Student Code.  As Ms. 
Mehta has not shown that Defendants failed to adhere to Program Procedures, we will 
                                              
5
 Under the Program Procedures, upon the faculty‟s recommendation of a 
remediation plan, the relevant faculty members must identify in writing the particular 
problems to the student and allow the student an opportunity to consult with those faculty 
members.  In addition, the procedures require the faculty members to present the student 
with the prescribed remediation plan at the time of consultation after which the Director 
of Clinical Training, the student‟s research advisor, and the student, if he or she agrees, 
will sign the remediation plan. 
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affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Ms. 
Mehta‟s breach of contract claim. 
C.  Defamation 
Ms. Mehta also claims that statements made by Dr. McGrath calling her a threat to 
public safety were defamatory.
6
  Under New Jersey law, “[a] statement is defamatory if it 
is false, communicated to a third person, and tends to lower the subject‟s reputation in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him.”  Lynch 
v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1135 (N.J. 1999).  “[O]pinion statements do not 
trigger liability unless they imply false underlying objective facts.”  Id. at 1137 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566).  Whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is a 
question of law for the court to decide.  Kotlikoff v. The Community News, 444 A.2d 
1086, 1090 (N.J. 1982).  As New Jersey courts have explained, a “pure” opinion, which 
is not actionable, “is one that is based on stated facts or facts that are known to the parties 
or assumed by them to exist.” Lynch, 735 A.2d at 1137 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A pure opinion also exists “when the maker of the comment does not spell out 
the alleged facts on which the opinion is based but both parties to the communication 
know the facts or assume their existence and the statement of opinion is obviously based 
on those assumed facts as justification for the opinion.”  Kotlilkoff, 444 A.2d at 1089.  On 
                                              
6
 The District Court concluded that the statement included in the email to Ms. 
Mehta containing the proposed remediation plan, which recommend that Ms. Mehta 
consider individual therapy, was not defamatory.  On appeal, Ms. Mehta has not 
contested the District Court‟s finding as to that statement.  
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the other hand, a “mixed” opinion, which is actionable, “is one not based on facts that are 
stated or assumed by the parties to exist.”  Lynch, 735 A.2d at 1137. 
Here, Dr. McGrath sent an email to the faculty in which he stated that, despite the 
imposition of the conditions in the remediation plan, he favored permitting Ms. Mehta to 
continue with her dissertation.  He also noted that “completion of the [dissertation] 
research would not hinder our case for terminating her on grounds of protection of the 
public.”  (App. 304.)  Based on the context, we conclude that Dr. McGrath was merely 
stating his opinion that allowing Ms. Mehta to continue her research would not 
necessarily preclude Defendants from terminating Ms. Mehta from the program—if she 
failed to meet the conditions of her remediation plan—based on Defendants‟ concerns for 
the safety of the public.  The facts upon which Dr. McGrath based his opinion were well 
known to the faculty recipients of the email, given that they were aware of Ms. Mehta‟s 
purported deficiencies in her clinical work and were involved in the creation of the 
remediation plan.  As a result, Dr. McGrath‟s statement in the email constituted “pure” 
opinion, and therefore is not susceptible to a defamation action. 
In addition, we also believe that Dr. McGrath expressed a pure opinion when he 
allegedly told Dr. Cohen, the director of the externship program, that Ms. Mehta was a 
“threat to public safety.”  According to Dr. McGrath‟s deposition testimony, in 
explaining to Dr. Cohen why Defendants were withdrawing their support for Ms. Mehta‟s 
placement as an extern, he “raised [Defendants‟] public safety obligation.”  (Id. at 232.)  
He elaborated that, in addition to the academic component, the psychology program 
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ultimately produces graduates who may become licensed psychologists and, as a result, 
Defendants have an obligation to take necessary steps if they believe a student created a 
risk to public safety.  Dr. McGrath told Dr. Cohen that Ms. Mehta‟s performance “met 
the criteria for” creating such a risk.  (Id.)  He informed Dr. Cohen that Defendants were 
concerned that Ms. Mehta did not follow up with a patient in the Clinic and that she had 
not submitted her testing paperwork on time.  Thus, in his communication to Dr. Cohen, 
Dr. McGrath stated the facts upon which he based his opinion regarding the public safety 
concern.
7
  Therefore, his communication meets the requirements of a pure opinion and, 
accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on Ms. Mehta‟s defamation claim. 
D. Negligence 
Ms. Mehta‟s final claim on appeal is that Defendants breached their duty to 
supervise her testing of patients and were therefore negligent.  Ms. Mehta‟s chief 
argument is that two New Jersey laws create a duty to supervise student psychologists.  
Ms. Mehta first points to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:14B-6(c), which provides that 
psychology students are not limited in their activity if they are supervised and their 
training status is indicated.  She relies on the principle that “the violation of a legislated 
                                              
7
 We recognize that, in his deposition, Dr. McGrath initially testified that he had 
not formulated an opinion that Ms. Mehta was a threat to public safety.  However, after 
further questioning regarding his communication with  Dr. Cohen, Dr. McGrath 
explained the information he relayed to Dr. Cohen and clarified how that information 
formed the basis of his opinion that Ms. Mehta‟s performance required Defendants to 
cancel her externship. 
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standard of conduct may be regarded as evidence of negligence if the plaintiff was a 
member of the class for whose benefit the standard was established.”  Alloway v. 
Bradlees, Inc. 723 A.2d 960, 967 (N.J. 1999).  The statutory scheme of which § 45:14B-6 
is a part, among other things, prohibits unlicensed persons from representing themselves 
as licensed psychologists and creates a cause of action for patients harmed by the 
violation of the licensing provisions.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:14B-5, 45:14B-42.  We 
agree with the District Court that New Jersey enacted this scheme to benefit patients 
rather than psychology students. 
The other law upon which Ms. Mehta bases her negligence claim is found in the 
New Jersey Administrative Code‟s exemption of graduate program psychology students 
from licensure requirements if they are under supervision.   See N.J. Admin. Code § 
13:42-1.4.  The only obligations the regulation places on the supervisor are to ensure that: 
1. The student‟s participation in the training program is a 
requirement of the graduate psychology program; 
2. The student‟s transcript . . . reflects prior academic training 
specific to the duties assigned to the student; and 
3. The student is clearly identified as a student intern or 
extern prior to engaging in psychological practice. 
 
Id.  The District Court correctly concluded that this provision creates no duty of care for 
supervisors vis-à-vis students.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of 




For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the Order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the discrimination claim, affirm the Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the remaining claims, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
